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Even though some countries track students into differing-ability schools by age 10, others 
keep their entire secondary-school system comprehensive. To estimate the effects of such 
institutional differences in the face of country heterogeneity, we employ an international 
differences-in-differences approach. We identify tracking effects by comparing differences in 
outcome between primary and secondary school across tracked and non-tracked systems. Six 
international student assessments provide eight pairs of achievement contrasts for between 18 
and 26 cross-country comparisons. The results suggest that early tracking increases 
educational inequality. While less clear, there is also a tendency for early tracking to reduce 
mean performance. Therefore, there does not appear to be any equity-efficiency trade-off.  
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1. Introduction 
Many countries worry about the relative merits of a selective versus comprehensive 
school system, and the resulting system choices are surprisingly different. Some countries 
track students into differing-ability schools as early as at age 10 (e.g., Austria, Germany, 
Hungary, and the Slovak Republic). By contrast, others including Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States essentially keep their entire lower 
secondary school system comprehensive. Parents and politicians alike would like to know 
whether it has consequences for the equity and efficiency of educational outcomes if a 
country tracks its students into different school types, hierarchically structured by 
performance. Such macro issues of institutional structure are extraordinarily difficult to 
evaluate within individual countries, largely because the variations in structure that exist there 
are almost certainly related to the characteristics of the families and schools choosing to 
follow an anomalous pattern. To deal with these analytical complexities, we provide evidence 
from international experiences across countries. 
The arguments about school placement policies – variously called tracking, streaming, 
or ability grouping – often rest on a perceived trade-off between equity and efficiency.1 Some 
discussions of tracking are mainly concerned with placements between different types of 
schools and others with placements into different tracks within schools, but the arguments for 
and against tracking are basically the same.2 The central argument behind tracking is that 
homogeneous classrooms permit a focused curriculum and appropriately paced instruction 
that leads to the maximum learning by all students. In such a situation, the teacher does not 
have to worry about boring the fastest learners or losing the slowest learners. The arguments 
for ungrouped classrooms largely revolve around concerns that the lower groups will be 
systematically disadvantaged by slower learning environments that leave them far behind the 
skills of those in the upper groups. The argument frequently goes further to relate preparation 
on entry into school to socio-economic background of the students, implying that grouping 
will also lead to continuing bias against more disadvantaged students. 
                                                 
1  It appears that the costs of tracked and untracked systems are roughly comparable. Therefore, although we 
do not perform any direct efficiency calculations, we often refer to variations in outcomes in the loose manner of 
efficiency differences. 
2  See the papers on “comprehensive and selective schooling” collected in Heath (1984) for examples of the 
UK-based discussion of streaming between schools and Slavin (1990) for an example of the US-based 
discussion of ability grouping within schools.    2
The argument in favor of or against tracking gets even more complicated once 
possible peer effects are taken into account, because the precise nature of any interactions 
then becomes a key element in considering tracking. Proponents of ungrouped classrooms 
often suggest that heterogeneous classrooms might give rise to efficiency gains through 
nonlinear peer effects: the higher ability students lose nothing, but the lower ability students 
gain through the interaction (from motivation, better classroom discussion, and the like). By 
contrast, if the impact of peer achievement is linear, tracking would tend to increase the 
variance in outcomes without having any clear impact on the level of achievement (e.g., 
Argys et al. 1996). And if individuals are better off with peers of their own ability level, 
tracking could even improve the level of performance while possibly also reducing inequality 
(e.g., Dobbelsteen et al. 2002).3 Thus, theory suggests considerable uncertainty about the 
impact of tracking on both the level and distribution of schooling outcomes.4 
So far, the empirical literature attempting to sort out the effects of tracking on both the 
level and distribution of outcomes has followed two general strategies. The difficulty for any 
empirical research is that the major elements of the institutional structure of schools are 
choices whose impact is difficult to separate from other influences on achievement. When 
some schools or local education authorities introduce alternative structures, these choices are 
likely to be linked to other features of the students and schools if for no other reason than 
parental choices of residence and schools. Thus, the first empirical approach, which focuses 
on tracking within schools, attempts to standardize for heterogeneity across institutional 
structures through statistical analyses of measured factors (see Argys et al. 1996; Betts and 
Skolnick 2000; Betts et al. 2003; Figlio and Page 2002).5  
Alternatively, if operating at the level of nations or states, the lack of within-state 
variation eliminates any control group unless there is variation over time. Thus, the second 
empirical approach, which focuses on tracking between different types of schools, looks 
within countries for situations where the institutional structure is altered and with some 
                                                 
3  Lazear (2001) provides an alternative model of possible externalities within classrooms that lead to nonlinear 
effects of peer composition on student outcomes, which also generally implies efficiency improvements through 
grouping. 
4  For recent advanced theoretical treatments of the effects of tracking, see Brunello and Giannini (2004); 
Epple et al. (2002); and Meier (2004). 
5  The direct analyses of tracking are also supplemented by investigations of peer achievement effects. Early 
peer investigations were not very concerned about problems of omitted variables and simultaneity (i.e., the 
“reflection problem”). More recent peer studies have concentrated on those issues (Hanushek et al. 2003; Hoxby 
2000). Nonetheless, the importance of peer ability remains disputed.   3
embellishments compares outcomes before and after.6 The results of the different empirical 
analyses, while far from uniform, tend to suggest that tracking leads to more inequality in 
outcomes, particularly from the perspective of family backgrounds (but see Figlio and Page 
2002 for an opposite finding). 
The concern with both empirical approaches is that other unmeasured factors bias the 
estimated impacts of tracking. For example, with the trend analyses, the change in tracking 
structure is frequently just one of a series of changes to the schools. While these studies also 
include a variety of controls for other observable factors, it is hard to assess whether they 
sufficiently capture the concomitant factors that might affect student outcomes over time. The 
statistical analyses of tracking that employ both national and local samples for U.S. schools 
face complications of family residential choice plus generally sparse controls for family, 
teacher, and school differences – elements that are likely both to affect achievement and to be 
related to the institutional structure of classrooms. 
To address these empirical problems, we use the macro variation in both the 
institutional structure of between-school tracking and student performance that exists across 
countries to sort out the impacts of tracking. Of course many other things also differ by 
country, leading us to adopt a differences-in-differences strategy to parse the effects of 
tracking. In this, we compare the level and distribution of performance of younger students 
(before tracking is introduced in any country) with those of older students (after some 
countries have started tracking) across countries with and without tracking, effectively using 
early outcomes in each country as the control. The existence of several large international 
assessment programs permits a consistent evaluation of student performance across a wide 
range of countries.  
Our analysis provides reasonably strong support for the disequalizing effects of early 
tracking. Variation in performance, measured in a variety of ways, tends to increase across 
levels of schooling when a country employs early tracking. On the other hand, the evidence 
about possible efficiency gains from tracking is more mixed. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
identification strategy in detail. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results on 
the impact of tracking on educational inequality, mean performance, and gainers and losers in 
the performance distribution. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
6  For analyses of structural changes in the United Kingdom and Sweden, see Dearden et al. (2002); Galina-
Rueda and Vignoles (2004); Harmon and Walker (2000); and Meghir and Palme (2004).   4
2. Cross-Country  Identification 
Understanding the impacts of macro institutional factors requires observing instances 
both of use of the structure and nonuse. In the case of between-school tracking, with the rare 
exception of when a country changes policies, the institution is common to all of the schools, 
implying that variation within countries is not useful.7 At the same time, international 
comparisons face monumental problems because of the heterogeneity of nations. Quite 
obviously, finance and operations of school systems as well as social structure, family 
backgrounds, and a host of other, often unobserved factors besides tracking affect the 
observed outcomes.  
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where individual achievement of student i in grade g and country c (
c
ig A ) is determined by a 
country specific intercept (α), varying attributes of families and schools (X), the existence of 
tracking (T), and an error (ε). In principle, if we could measure the various inputs to 
achievement, we could directly estimate equation (1). Two problems exist, however. First, we 
do not have sufficient knowledge or data to be confident of any estimates of the β (see 
Hanushek 2003). Second, with respect to the influences of tracking, if every student in the 
country is subject to tracking, T will be a constant, and we cannot estimate its influence on 
achievement. 
In reality, no country tracks students between differing-ability schools in the early 
primary grades. Thus, we can consider looking at the changes that occur between primary 
school (grade g) and later schooling (grade g
*). A simple estimate of the impact of tracking 
could be found by looking at the average difference in achievement between g and g
* for a 
country that introduced tracking during that period: 
(2)  ( )
c c c
X A ε β γ ∆ + ∆ + = ∆  
In principle, if none of the X’s changed much and if the change in average errors had an 
expected value of zero, we could estimate the impact of tracking (γ) simply by observing the 
growth in achievement over time for a single country.  
                                                 
7  In the US, the use of magnet schools with specialized curriculum does vary across cities. These programs 
have not been evaluated very thoroughly, and both their existence and the selection rules for students is often 
closely related to their use as a device for the racial desegregation of schools.   5
It is nonetheless implausible to believe that all systematic influences across grades and 
across different tests are irrelevant to achievement. Specifically, the normal pattern of 
achievement gains between g and g
* would be intertwined with the impact of tracking. To 
deal with this, we can compare the growth in achievement across tracked countries and 
untracked countries, where the countries without tracking indicate the expected achievement 
gain in the absence of tracking: 
(3)  ( ) untracked tracked untracked tracked A A ν ν γ − + ∆ − ∆ =  
The impact of tracking can then be estimated by comparing the average achievement gain in 
tracked countries to that in untracked countries (where the double bar indicates averages 
across the groups of countries).  
The estimation still depends upon the expected composite errors (ν) being 
uncorrelated with the existence of tracking. This would be violated if, for example, the 
observed tests came from widely different cohorts of students such that the X’s were to 
change (and to be correlated across countries with the existence of tracking), or if tracked 
nations tended to introduce more changes in their schools between the testing of students in 
different grades. We return to this below. 
In reality, we estimate equation (3) in a regression framework where mean 
performance in grade g
* is regressed on mean performance in grade g along with an indicator 
for the existence of tracking. Thus, our approach applies a differences-in-differences 
methodology to the cross-country comparisons, combining tests in primary school with tests 
in secondary school. The effect of tracking is identified by comparing performance 
differences between primary and secondary school across tracked and non-tracked systems, 
where each country’s own primary-school outcome is used as a control for its secondary-
school outcome.  
We also estimate a similar equation for inequality in performance. The simplest model 
is one where the variation in outcomes within countries are magnified (or shrunk) by the use 
of tracking. Again, the most basic model is a regression of late variance on early variance plus 
an indicator for tracking.  
3.  School Performance Data 
International testing of students began in the early 1960s when the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) developed a mathematics   6
test that could be used to compare student performance across countries. Although the earliest 
testing was plagued by uncertainties about the within-country sampling, the selectivity of 
students who were not in school, and a variety of other factors, more recent testing has 
followed strict protocols with elaborate efforts to ensure both high quality test designs and 
representative sampling of students. 
To implement the differences-in-differences estimation, we concentrate on the series 
of international assessments conducted since 1995. We match international student 
achievement tests in secondary school with tests late in primary school. Because the 
methodology requires a stable educational system, we concentrate on roughly 
contemporaneous measures of performance at the two different grade levels.8 We supplement 
the six different test observations that meet this requirement, however, by following the 1995 
cohort of 4
th grade students that subsequently was assessed in the 8
th grade in 1999 (on the 
TIMSS math and science tests). Table 1 summarizes the comparisons that are used, and the 
data and sources are described in detail in the Appendix.  
Tests are found in reading, mathematics, and science. Each assessment produces 18 to 
26 country level observations. For analytical purposes, the differences in the tests and 
subjects lead us to treat each of the eight assessment pairs as a separate test of the impacts of 
early tracking, although the common grouping of countries implies that these are not truly 
independent tests. 
In our analyses, we use the data on age of first tracking as a dummy representing 
whether an education systems tracks its students before the age at which the specific 
secondary-school test is performed or not. For the PISA secondary-school tests, we consider 
tracking by age 15 (the average student age on the two PISA tests is 15 years and 9 months); 
for the TIMSS secondary-school tests, we consider tracking by age 14 at the latest 
(corresponding to an average testing age of 14 years and 5 months). Half the countries in our 
samples based on the PISA tests had a tracked system by the age of 15. The share of countries 
that tracked by the age of 14 in the TIMSS tests is roughly one third (see Appendix Table 
A2), reflecting both the earlier testing age and the different country compositions of the 
samples.  
                                                 
8  Comparing different cohorts at one point in time minimizes any contamination of variations in other school 
policies, but it does so at the cost of any inherent variation in family background and peers that exists across 
different cohorts. Although we also follow a single cohort (see below), we emphasize comparisons at a given 
time because we believe that school policies tend to be more volatile than family backgrounds of cohorts.  
Table 1: Matching Pairs of International Tests in Primary and Secondary School 
  Secondary-school test  Primary-school test  Subject  Joint 
 Test  Year Grade/Age  Test  Year Grade/Age    countries 
1. PISA
  2003 15-year-olds PIRLS
  2001 4th  grade Reading  18 
2. PISA 2000/02  15-year-olds PIRLS  2001  4th  grade  Reading  20 
3. TIMSS
  1995  8th grade  TIMSS  1995  4th grade  Math  26 
4.  TIMSS  1995  8th grade  TIMSS  1995  4th grade  Science  26 
5.  TIMSS  2003  8th grade  TIMSS  2003  4th grade  Math  25 
6.  TIMSS  2003  8th grade  TIMSS  2003  4th grade  Science  25 
7.  TIMSS  1999  8th grade  TIMSS  1995  4th grade  Math  18 
8.  TIMSS  1999  8th grade  TIMSS  1995  4th grade  Science  18 
Notes: PISA = Program for International Student Assessment. – PIRLS = Progress in International Reading Literacy Study. – 
TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (formerly Third International Mathematics and Science 
Study). 
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4.  Impacts of Early Tracking 
Because of the importance attached to inequality in the existing literature, we begin 
with an analysis of distributional aspects of tracking. This is followed by implications for 
mean performance.  
4.1  Tracking and Inequality 
The nature of the international comparisons and the relationship with tracking is 
easiest to see in the data on inequality for the most recent comparison: reading performance 
on the 2003 administration of the PISA test for 15 year olds compared to the 2001 
administration of the PIRLS test for 4
th graders. Figure 1 plots the relative standard deviation 
of scores for countries with early tracking (solid lines) versus countries without early tracking 
(dashed lines).9  
Relative inequality increases in every country with tracking except the Slovak 
Republic, while relative inequality decreases in every country without tracking except for 
Sweden and Latvia. Out of the 18 countries, the top four countries in terms of the increase in 
inequality between primary and secondary school are all early trackers (Germany with an 
increase of 0.71, Greece 0.30, Czech Republic 0.25, and Italy 0.22). The bottom six countries 
with the largest decrease in inequality are all late trackers that do not track before the age of 
PISA testing (Turkey -0.63, New Zealand -0.50, Canada -0.32, United States -0.27, Norway -
0.14, and Hong Kong -0.13). 
The regression analysis expands this to consider different measures of inequality: the 
standard deviation of test scores within each country; the test-score difference between the 
student performing at the 75
th percentile and the student performing at the 25
th percentile in 
each country; and the performance difference between the 95
th and the 5
th percentile. We also 
provide a comparison with estimation of a simple model of average achievement that, along 
the lines of equation (1), compares mean performance of the 15 year olds just to tracking. 
As the results reported in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 2 show, none of the three 
inequality measures is statistically significantly related to tracking in a simple bivariate 
analysis. However, as argued in Section 2, these bivariate estimates may be biased by general 
heterogeneity in inequality of the participating countries. Thus, columns (2), (4), and (6) 
report differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of early tracking on the three 
                                                 
9  Standard deviations are expressed relative to the average national standard deviation on each test.  
Figure 1: Inequality in Primary and Secondary School 
 
Notes: Standard deviation of test scores in the national population (difference to international 
average of national standard deviations in each test). – Countries with a tracked school system 
before the age of 16 have solid lines, countries without tracking before age 16 have dashed lines.  
  
Table 2: Tracking and Inequality: PISA 2003 and PIRLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Measure of inequality:  Standard deviation  75
th-25
th percentile difference  95
th-5
th percentile difference 




  (0.136) (0.110) (0.206) (0.185) (0.462) (0.376) 












  (0.092) (0.399) (0.153) (0.781) (0.316) (1.332) 
Number of countries  18  18  18  18  18  18 
R
2    0.007 0.479 0.035 0.366 0.006 0.506 
Dependent variable: Inequality in secondary school, as indicated in top row. – Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors in parentheses. – Significance levels: 
*** 1 percent. – 
** 5 percent. – 
* 10 percent. 
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inequality measures which condition on the extent of educational inequality already present in 
late primary school, before tracking in any country. With all three measures of inequality, it is 
obvious that countries that exert high inequality already in primary school also tend to have 
high inequality in secondary school. The point estimates of roughly 0.6 indicate that schools 
everywhere tend to reduce the inequality which was present in primary grades – and which 
presumably represents the proportionately greater influence of families.  
More importantly, on all three measures of inequality, countries that track their 
students before age 15 show a statistically significantly larger inequality on the PISA 2003 
secondary-school test, once the difference in inequality that existed already in primary school 
is accounted for. Specifically, early trackers show a national standard deviation of test scores 
in secondary school that is one quarter of a cross-country standard deviation larger than non-
trackers. Consider for example the observed country differences in outcome variation. The 
minimum national standard deviation of 3.5 (Hong Kong and the Netherlands) is noticeably 
different from the maximum national standard deviation of 4.5 (Germany) on the PISA 2003 
test. The results suggest that the effect of early tracking can account for one quarter of the 
difference in inequality between the most inequitable and the most equitable country.  
Figure 1 makes apparent why simple bivariate estimates do not reveal this pattern: 
None of the five countries with the largest inequality in primary school (New Zealand, 
Turkey, United States, Norway, and Iceland) have early tracking of students. Across the 
countries, the correlation between the national standard deviation in primary school and the 
early-tracking dummy is -0.472 (statistically significant at the 5 percent level).  
The estimates across the other seven pairs of international achievement tests are 
generally consistent with the results in Table 2 but are not as strong or statistically significant. 
Table 3 reports the differences-in-differences results using the standard deviation as the 
inequality measure.10 With the exception of the PISA 2000/02-PIRLS pair, all estimates of the 
coefficient on early tracking are positive, and four are statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level or better. For the insignificant results of columns (11)-(13), inequality in secondary 
school is not even statistically significantly related to inequality in primary school, raising 
some concerns about the specific tests.  
The limited samples of countries preclude very elaborate specification checks, but 
some extensions are interesting. First, rather than entering the tracking variable as a dummy, 
                                                 
10  Given the consistency across measures of inequality, we report only the results for standard deviations. The 
results for the other two measures were qualitatively very similar.  
Table 3: Tracking and Inequality: Different Tests 
  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Secondary-school test:   PISA 03  PISA 00/02 TIMSS 95 TIMSS 95 TIMSS 03 TIMSS 03  TIMSS 99 TIMSS 99
Primary-school test:  PIRLS  PIRLS  TIMSS 95 TIMSS 95 TIMSS 03 TIMSS 03  TIMSS 95 TIMSS 95
Subject:  Reading  Reading Math Science Math Science Math Science 
Early tracking  0.248
** -0.018 0.147
* 0.197
** 0.013  0.105  0.005 0.208
* 
  (0.110) (0.077) (0.076) (0.084) (0.054) (0.073) (0.074) (0.107) 
Inequality in primary school  0.594
*** 0.255
* 0.476  0.843
*** -0.014  0.252  0.099 0.785
*** 
   (standard deviation)  (0.129) (0.139) (0.306) (0.224) (0.248) (0.176) (0.146) (0.135) 
Constant 2.165
*** 1.829





  (0.399) (0.325) (0.499) (0.411) (0.291) (0.189) (0.255) (0.275) 
Number  of  countries  18 20 26 26 25 25 18 18 
R
2    0.479 0.255 0.258 0.419 0.003 0.257 0.022 0.558 
Dependent variable: Inequality in secondary school, measured by the standard deviation in test scores. – Huber-White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. – Significance levels: 
*** 1 percent. – 
** 5 percent. – 
* 10 percent. 
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we can also enter tracking as a linear variable depicting the age at which a country first tracks 
its students. Unfortunately, the continuous variation in when the tracking occurs is limited, 
with no country starting to track at the age of 13, for example. Results using the linear 
tracking variable (available from the authors) are broadly consistent with results using the 
simple existence of tracking, and the main impact comes from the mere existence of early 
tracking with no consistent linear pattern detectable for the age at which tracking occurred.  
Additionally, experimentation with adding further control variables to the estimation 
did not change the basic results. In terms of the estimates of Table 2, adding GDP per capita 
and/or a country’s cumulative educational expenditure per student by age 15 left the impact of 
tracking largely unchanged.11  
4.2  Tracking and Mean Performance 
Given that comprehensive schooling systems seem to reduce inequality, the question 
arises whether this effect is achieved by improving the lowest performers or by holding back 
the best performers. That is, does performance converge at a lower or higher level? We first 
estimate the effect of tracking on a country’s mean performance level using the same 
differences-in-differences identification strategy as before; following that, we estimate the 
effects at different percentiles of student performance in the next section.  
Table 4 reports the results on the effect of early tracking on mean performance for all 
8 pairs of international student achievement tests. In all pairs, we see a clear tendency for 
countries which performed better on average in primary school to also perform better in 
secondary school.  
The impact of early tracking is, however, inconsistent across subjects and tests. The 
two reading comparisons indicate a statistically significant lower achievement associated with 
early tracking. Similarly, the mathematics results are always lower with early tracking, 
although the result is statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better in only one of the 
three comparisons. For science, however, two of the three estimates indicate positive 
achievement effects from early tracking (and one is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level).  
                                                 
11  OECD (2004) reports GDP per capita (in purchasing power parities) for 15 of the 18 countries. When 
included, it enters statistically significantly positive, while the tracking dummy also remains statistically 
significantly positive. The expenditure measure (again in purchasing power parities) is available for 13 countries 
but does not enter significantly, although the significance level of the tracking dummy falls to 15 percent.   
Table 4: Tracking and Mean Performance 
  (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
Secondary-school test:  PISA 03  PISA 00/02  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 99  TIMSS 99 
Primary-school test:  PIRLS  PIRLS  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 95 
Subject:  Reading  Reading Math Science Math Science Math Science 
Early tracking  -1.053
*** -0.951
*** -0.062  0.597
** -0.021 -0.013 -0.410
* 0.234 
  (0.343) (0.287) (0.135) (0.222) (0.157) (0.161) (0.219) (0.370) 













* 0.006  0.004  0.137 -0.078 
  (0.230) (0.203) (0.087) (0.103) (0.101) (0.095) (0.079) (0.102) 
Number  of  countries  18 20 26 26 25 25 18 18 
R
2    0.582 0.635 0.900 0.779 0.858 0.863 0.921 0.751 
Dependent variable: Mean performance in secondary school. – Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses. – Significance levels: 
*** 1 percent. – 
** 5 percent. – 
* 10 percent. 
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As an alternative approach, we allow for the possible correlation of the residuals of the 
inequality and the mean-performance equations. In order to improve the estimation efficiency, 
we estimate the two equations by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The results in 
Appendix Table A3 reveal no change in any of the substantive previous results, only lifting 
the significance level of the effect of early tracking on inequality in the TIMSS 2003 science 
test.  
4.3  Who Gains, Who Loses? 
One final issue is where any losses (or gains) from early tracking are found in the 
distribution. To address this, we estimate the effect of early tracking on the performance of 
students at different percentiles of the performance distribution, again in differences-in-
differences models. Specifically, we estimate whether a student at the 5




th percentiles) of the national distribution is affected by tracking. Although effects 
cannot be statistically significantly estimated in most pairs of international achievement tests, 
where they can, they reinforce the results in Tables 2-4. 
For example, the increased inequality and decreased mean performance in tracked 
systems detected in the PISA 2003-PIRLS pair come from the lower percentiles losing more 
than the upper ones, even though each of the four percentiles loses a statistically significant 
amount. The coefficient estimates on the early-tracking dummy for the different achievement 
levels are depicted in Figure 2, which shows that lower performers suffer more from early 
tracking than higher ones.  
Across the estimates from the remaining samples (available from the authors), the 
most striking finding is that in no case do some students gain at the expense of others; both 
high and low achievers lose (or, in the one case of a positive effect on mean performance, 
gain) from tracking. The net impact comes from the differential impacts on different parts of 
the distribution. 
5. Conclusion 
This analysis provides preliminary results about the impact of early tracking on the 
level and distribution student performance. The results consistently indicate that early 
tracking increases inequality in achievement. Although the evidence on the level of  
Figure 2: The Effect of Tracking on Performance  









5th 25th 75th 95th
 
Note: Coefficient estimate on the early-tracking dummy in separate differences-in-
differences estimations of the performance of the X
th percentile in PISA 2003 on the 
performance of the X
th percentile in PIRLS and the early-tracking dummy.  
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performance is less certain, there is very little evidence that there are efficiency gains 
associated with this increased inequality. 
On the research side, these preliminary results also suggest the value of further study 
of tracking. Some of the literature has suggested that one channel for increasing inequality is 
reinforcing the effects of family background. Specifically, if much of the early inequality in 
achievement is associated with differences in family background, many of the track 
placements will be associated directly with family background. Indeed, some have suggested 
that family background is a driving force in setting track placements even beyond its impact 
on early achievement levels (e.g., Schnepf 2003). The implications for family background 
inequality can potentially be investigated through use of the micro data generated by the 
international assessments. Beyond that, with the micro data it would be possible to consider 
more fully the underlying structural model of achievement that would generate these patterns 
of aggregate outcomes. Also, extending the dichotomous analysis between tracked and non-
tracked systems pursued in this paper, there may be heterogeneity in the rigidity of tracked 
systems. Future research may explore the extent to which allowing mobility across tracks 
might reduce the negative effects of tracking.  
From a policy perspective, it seems incumbent on those advocating early tracking in 
schools to identify the potential gains from this. These preliminary results suggest that 
countries lose in terms of the distribution of outcomes, and possibly also in levels of 
outcomes, by pursuing such policies.   12
Appendix: Data Sources and Description 
The most recent international test employed is the 2003 edition (data release: December 2004) of the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).12 PISA tested representative samples of 15-year-old students in reading, 
math, and science, with a focus of test items on real-life applications. A recent primary-school test to which the 
PISA test can be matched is the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS). In 2001, the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) conducted the PIRLS reading 
test to 4
th-grade students,13 which is the grade just before the first countries start tracking their schools. There 
are 18 countries that participated both in PISA 2003 and in PIRLS. Appendix Table A1 provides a list of 
countries participating in each pair of tests.  
Since the mid-1990s, there are seven further international student achievement tests at the end of lower 
secondary education to which we can match specific primary-school tests, all of which tested representative 
samples of students in each participating countries (see Table 1). The first PISA study, also testing 15-year-olds 
in reading, math, and science, was conducted in 2000 for most participating countries and in 2002 for several 
additional countries. We match the PISA 2000/02 test again with the 2001 PIRLS primary-school test, which 
gives a sample of 20 countries participating in both tests. Next, the IEA performed the Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS, later re-named to Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study) in 1995, which tested both 4
th-grade and 8
th-grade students in math and science.14 Matching the TIMSS 
1995 tests in primary and secondary school, there are 26 countries participating both in the two math tests and in 
the two science tests. The next primary-school TIMSS tests were conducted in 2003, which we can match to the 
TIMSS 2003 secondary-school tests, yielding a sample of 25 countries participating in primary and secondary 
school both in math and in science.  
All these matches test primary- and secondary-school students at exactly or roughly the same point in 
time. We can also follow specific cohorts of students over time. This is possible by relating the 8
th-grade 
performance on the TIMSS tests in 1999 to the 4
th-grade performance on the TIMSS tests in 1995. That is, the 
very same cohort which was tested in math and science in 4
th grade in 1995 was again tested in 8
th grade in 
1999. 18 countries participated both in the 1995 4
th-grade and in the 1999 8
th-grade math and science tests, 
allowing for matching of representative samples from the same cohort followed over time.  
We take the data on means, standard deviations, and percentiles of the test-score performance on the 
different international tests from the following sources: OECD (2003; 2004) for reading performance in PISA 
2000/2002 and PISA 2003; Mullis et al. (2003) for reading performance in PIRLS; Beaton et al. (1996a; 1996b) 
for secondary-school math and science performance in TIMSS 1995; Mullis et al. (1997; 2000; 2004) for math 
performance in TIMSS 1995 primary school, TIMSS 1999 and TIMSS 2003; and Martin et al. (1997; 2000; 
2004) for science performance in TIMSS 1995 primary school, TIMSS 1999 and TIMSS 2003.  
For the purposes of this paper, we re-scale the test scores of each primary-secondary pair of tests so that 
they are normalized to have a mean of zero and a cross-country standard deviation of one between the countries 
jointly participating at both test levels. Note that this normalization refers to the cross-country variation of test 
scores among the sample of participating countries only, without considering possible differences in the within-
country variation of test scores between the primary- and secondary-school tests. Thus, for example, the mean of 
the standard deviation of test scores within each country is considerably larger in the PISA 2003 test than in the 
PIRLS test, at 4.0 versus 2.9 cross-country standard variations on each of the tests, respectively. That is, in PISA 
2003, the standard deviation of test scores within a country was, on average, four times as large as the standard 
deviation of test scores across the 18 countries.  
We collected data on the age at which students are tracked into different schools for the first time in each 
country from different sources, including the data collections of the European Commission (2000; 2002), the 
Encyclopedia of national education systems of Postlethwaite (1996), a table in OECD (2003), and detailed 
                                                 
12  TIMSS assessments for 2003 were also released in December 2004, but we start with the PISA 2003 test 
because it tests students who are older and thus longer exposed to tracking than the students tested in the TIMSS 
tests and because it has a broader coverage of developed countries.  
13  Specifically, PIRLS tested the upper of the two adjacent grades with the largest share of nine-year-olds in 
each country, which is usually fourth grade. 
14  Specifically, the different TIMSS tests tested the upper of the two adjacent grades with the largest share of 9-
year-olds (4
th grade) and 13-year-olds (8
th grade), respectively, in each country. The first TIMSS test also tested 
the lower of each of these grades (3
rd and 7
th grade), but we stick with 4
th and 8
th grade because 4
th grade is just 
before the first countries start tracking their schools and 8
th grade allows more time for tracking to exert its 
effects.   13
country-specific inquiries. The mean age of students at the time of first tracking across the 45 countries 
considered in this paper is 15.2, ranging from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 18. 
Descriptive statistics for the eight pairs of international tests are presented in Appendix Table A2. 
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Table A1: Countries Participating in Each Pair of Tests 





















Canada Argentina  Australia  Armenia  Australia 
Czech Republic  Bulgaria  Austria  Australia  Canada 
France  Canada Canada Belgium  (Flemish)  Cyprus 
Germany  Czech  Republic  Cyprus Cyprus Czech  Republic 
Greece France Czech  Republic  England  England 
Hong Kong  Germany  England  Hong Kong  Hong Kong 
Hungary  Greece Greece Hungary  Hungary 
Iceland  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Iran  Iran 
Italy  Hungary Hungary Italy  Israel 
Latvia  Iceland Iceland Japan  Japan 
Netherlands Israel  Iran  Latvia  Korea 
New Zealand  Italy  Ireland  Lithuania  Latvia 
Norway Latvia  Israel  Moldova  Netherlands 
Russian Federation  Macedonia  Japan  Morocco  New Zealand 
Slovak Republic  New Zealand  Korea  Netherlands  Singapore 
Sweden Norway Kuwait  New  Zealand  Slovenia 
Turkey Russian  Federation  Latvia  Norway  Thailand 
United States  Sweden  Netherlands Philippines  United  States 
  United Kingdom  New Zealand  Russian Federation   
 United  States  Norway  Scotland   
  Portugal  Singapore   
    Scotland Slovenia  
  Singapore  Taipei   
  Slovenia  Tunisia   
  Thailand  United  States   
  United  States    
 
  
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Each Pair of Tests 
  ––––––––––  National mean  ––––––––––  –––  National standard deviation  –––
  Mean SD  Min Max  Mean  Min Max 
Age of first tracking  
   (45 countries)  15.222 2.679  10  18       
Pair  1.  (18  countries)         
   PISA 2003 reading  0  1  -2.040  1.570  3.993  3.528  4.524 
   PIRLS 2001 reading  0  1  -3.202  1.293  2.867  2.288  3.732 
      Early  tracking  0.500        
Pair  2.  (20  countries)         
   PISA 2000/02 reading  0  1  -2.657  1.235  2.380  2.031  2.684 
   PIRLS 2001 reading  0  1  -2.952  1.092  2.200  1.778  2.954 
      Early  tracking  0.500        
Pair  3.  (26  countries)         
   TIMSS 1995 8
th-grade  math  0  1  -2.350 2.258 1.604 1.065 2.001 
   TIMSS 1995 4
th-grade  math  0  1  -2.457 1.836 1.569 1.279 1.985 
      Early  tracking  0.308        
Pair  4.  (26  countries)         
   TIMSS 1995 8
th-grade  science  0  1  -2.435 1.998 2.255 1.803 2.655 
   TIMSS 1995 4
th-grade  science  0  1  -2.678 1.575 1.802 1.432 2.105 
      Early  tracking  0.308        
Pair  5.  (25  countries)         
   TIMSS 2003 8
th-grade  math  0  1  -1.997 1.863 1.311 1.020 1.700 
   TIMSS 2003 4
th-grade  math  0  1  -2.223 1.399 1.131 0.781 1.563 
      Early  tracking  0.280        
Pair  6.  (25  countries)         
   TIMSS 2003 8
th-grade  science  0  1  -2.327 1.432 1.391 1.122 1.907 
   TIMSS 2003 4
th-grade  science  0  1  -2.515 1.043 1.143 0.723 1.977 
   Early tracking  0. 280             
Pair  7.  (18  countries)         
   TIMSS 1999 8
th-grade  math  0  1  -2.043 1.762 1.705 1.526 2.007 
   TIMSS 1995 4
th-grade  math  0  1  -2.384 1.711 1.743 1.441 2.172 
      Early  tracking  0.333        
Pair  8.  (18  countries)         
   TIMSS 1999 8
th-grade  science  0  1  -2.075 1.375 2.433 2.013 3.019 
   TIMSS 1995 4
th-grade  science  0  1  -2.698 1.500 1.904 1.530 2.249 
      Early  tracking  0.333        
 
  
Table A3: Tracking, Inequality and Mean Performance: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
  (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
Secondary-school test:  PISA 03  PISA 00/02  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 99  TIMSS 99 
Primary-school test:  PIRLS  PIRLS  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 03  TIMSS 95  TIMSS 95 
Subject:  Reading  Reading Math Science Math Science Math Science 
Dependent variable: Standard deviation in secondary school      






  (0.106) (0.068) (0.080) (0.085) (0.056) (0.063) (0.060) (0.086) 

















  (0.451) (0.224) (0.356) (0.380) (0.175) (0.118) (0.246) (0.275) 
R
2  0.479 0.255 0.258 0.419 0.003 0.257 0.021 0.557 
Dependent variable: Mean performance in secondary school      
Early tracking  -1.057
*** -0.952
*** -0.042 0.554
*** -0.023  -0.021 -0.323
** 0.288 
  (0.304) (0.264) (0.157) (0.211) (0.167) (0.162) (0.155) (0.249) 









   in primary school  (0.156) (0.134) (0.074) (0.098) (0.077) (0.074) (0.068) (0.098) 
Constant 0.528
** 0.476
** 0.013 -0.170 0.007 0.006 0.108 -0.096 
  (0.212) (0.186) (0.078) (0.111) (0.087) (0.086) (0.083) (0.141) 
R
2  0.582 0.635 0.900 0.776 0.858 0.861 0.915 0.743 
Number  of  countries  18 20 26 26 25 25 18 18 
The two equations in each column are jointly estimated with seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). – Standard errors in 
parentheses. – Significance levels: 
*** 1 percent. – 
** 5 percent. – 
* 10 percent. 
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